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One of the characteristics of globalization has been the marked 
volatility of financial flows. The realization that this was affecting growth and 
equity induced the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
held in Monterrey in 2002, to adopt a global commitment to deal with the 
issue of development financing. Since then there has been a mixture of 
progress, backsliding and inaction. This article conducts a brief review of 
financial globalization and the current global crisis. It then examines the 
Monterrey Consensus, the evaluations by the United Nations Secretariat 
of compliance with the commitments accepted, and the financial system 
reforms needed to make globalization more equitable. It then proceeds 
to a stocktaking of the progress made under a North-South collaboration 
initiative, Action against Hunger and Poverty, in applying “innovative 
financing mechanisms” that can contribute to attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals and help developing countries cope with critical 
situations like the current global recession. It concludes with proposals 
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Of  all the remarkable features of  the current 
globalization process, one of the most striking has 
been the huge boom in international financial flows, 
of which volatility is a marked characteristic. These 
are not harmless fluctuations but great swings that 
translate into powerful economic cycles, extending 
over long periods of time and qualitatively affecting 
resource allocation and equity, thereby sowing the 
seeds of growing imbalances until they trigger costly 
recessions in the real economy. Time and again, Latin 
America has been among the first to fall victim to 
shocks of this kind. The epicentre of today’s crisis in 
the international financial markets was to be found, 
however, in the world’s leading economy, a promoter 
of liberalized markets. Today, most of the world has 
been dragged down into a situation that originated 
in the globalization of financial volatility. Its severe 
worldwide consequences ought, at long last, to spur 
an urgently needed correction in the international 
financial architecture.
Following this introduction, section II offers 
a brief  review of  financial globalization and the 
current global crisis. Section III examines the main 
international effort made in recent decades to correct 
the severe shortcomings of  financial markets and 
reorient them towards development financing, 
namely the International Conference on Financing 
for Development held in Monterrey in March 2002. 
It then goes on to evaluate the increasingly urgent 
warnings of  the United Nations Secretariat about 
the need to step up compliance with the Monterrey 
Consensus commitments that came out of  the 
Conference and to make further corrections to bring 
about the kind of  development financing needed 
if  globalization is to benefit developing countries. 
Section IV summarizes the activities and advances 
of  the Action against Hunger and Poverty Initiative, 
led by the heads of  government of  Brazil, Chile and 
France and the United Nations Secretary-General; 
particularly, the proposals for “innovative financing 
mechanisms” that can contribute to more equitable 
development and help combat financial volatility, 
while supporting developing countries in their 
efforts to deal with critical situations such as the 
current global recession. Lastly, section V describes 
the challenges that need to be met during this crisis 
if  the foundations for sustained development are to 
be strengthened.





The globalization of financial
volatility and the present crisis
The seeds of  the current global crisis were sown 
gradually over the years and decades that preceded 
it. The main trigger were developments in the 
financial markets, with their strongly short-termist 
and speculative bias. Following the disastrous collapse 
of the 1930s, the international capital markets began 
to expand significantly in the mid-1960s (Díaz-
Alejandro, 1985; Devlin, 1989; Eichengreen, 2003). 
The process has gathered pace in recent years as rapid 
diversification has led to the introduction of a growing 
number of opaque and speculation-prone segments.
In part, the increase in financial flows undoubtedly 
reflects the growth of  the world economy, rising 
international trade and the globalization of 
production. However, it is also due to factors of  a 
financial nature whose influence has been increasing 
far more rapidly, particularly since the 1990s. The 
ever-growing presence of  offshore international 
financial centres, combined with light or non-existent 
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regulation, stimulated capital movements by making 
it possible to circumvent national financial regulations 
and capital controls and taxes. This phenomenon, 
together with revolutionary innovations in information 
and communication technologies, and the use of 
increasingly sophisticated financial techniques (many 
of  them employing off-balance sheet operations to 
create excessive leverage), contributed structurally 
to the remarkable boom in international capital 
flows. Procyclical macroeconomic policies were the 
other factor that set the scene for imbalances which 
were to become increasingly explosive, given the 
scale of  the resources involved and the volatility 
characterizing them.
Using information from the Bank for 
International Settlements, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) 
and the World Bank, it can be estimated that about 
US$ 40 are traded in the currency markets for every 
dollar of international trade in goods and services. 
This uneven proportion indicates that the same 
funds are traded several times a day, usually without 
connection to any actual international trade. This 
may benefit those who wish to operate in a market 
where prices are quoted daily and where it is always 
easy to buy and sell, but it represents a problem for 
the macroeconomic environment in the rest of the 
economy, which is where the overwhelming majority 
of  firms and workers operate. The fast-expanding 
financial markets are subject to frequent “mood 
swings” that affect expectations of  the price of 
the dollar, for example, so that funds which were 
flowing into a particular geographical market may 
suddenly emigrate to another.1 Decisions of  this 
type in the financial and currency markets have very 
powerful effects on the real economy, i.e., on output, 
employment, profits and tax revenues.
Generally speaking, the financial boom took 
place in a context of flexible or fragmented regulation 
and oversight and was characterized by a procyclical 
bias (Ocampo, 2007; United Nations, 1999). The lack 
1 Greenfield (production-oriented) foreign direct investment (fdi) 
is usually channelled into fixed assets that are “irreversible” in the 
short run, meaning that funds cannot be pulled out from one day to 
the next. Conversely, resources of a financial nature can depart in a 
matter of seconds. This is why financial investment and greenfield 
fdi are treated differently in economic research and in the policy 
approaches of  a number of  countries that have behaved more 
responsibly. This was what happened in Chile during the first half of 
the 1990s, for example, when a reserve requirement was introduced 
to prevent excessive financial inflows without discouraging fdi (see 
Ffrench-Davis, 2008, chapter IX).
of regulation was not uniform. Banking systems, for 
example, continued to be closely regulated, especially 
in the developed economies.2 Nonetheless, as already 
mentioned, supervision had a procyclical bias, and 
this was heightened after the second agreement of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
II) (Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 2005; Stallings and 
Studart, 2006).
In any event, the main difficulties arose because 
of three very marked features of financial activities. 
First, regulation of  expanding segments (such as 
stock markets) or new ones (international investment 
funds, hedge funds and derivatives markets), which 
had come to make up the bulk of financial markets, 
was weak or non-existent. Consequently, these 
financial “innovations” meant a profound lack of 
transparency. In a context where these markets 
were constantly expanding, it became more and 
more difficult to grasp the risks involved, including 
the frauds that would be detected subsequently. 
Secondly, agents in markets of  this sort usually 
take a short-termist approach when allocating the 
funds they manage, a bias heightened by prevailing 
incentive systems (Williamson, 2003a). They also 
operate with liquid resources and internationally, 
creating huge macroeconomic volatility in individual 
countries. A third characteristic is the predominance 
of a markedly procyclical neoliberal macroeconomic 
approach (Ffrench-Davis, 2005, chapter V; Ocampo, 
2007), with sharp currency and monetary cycles. 
Two manifestations of this were the giant external 
deficit of the United States and the real exchange-
rate appreciation experienced in Latin America 
from 2004.
The costs of  the “financieristic” approach 
have been seen repeatedly in emerging economies, 
as demonstrated by the so-called tequila crisis, the 
subsequent crisis in East Asia and the 1998-2003 
recession in Latin America. The current crisis, which 
originated in the United States before spreading to 
much of the planet and which has also centred on 
the financial markets, has some specific ingredients 
in common with our own recent experiences.
It is hard to predict exactly when crises will break 
out, but what is increasingly feasible is to identify 
when the ground is being prepared for them. We have 
often seen massive capital inflows pushing emerging 
2 In the Latin American economies, on the other hand, bank 
privatization was accompanied by loose regulations, giving rise to a 
series of banking crises that were very costly for national States.
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economies into situations of vulnerability, including 
the following: (i) substantial current-account deficits, 
(ii) large external liabilities that exceed international 
reserves and have a significant liquid component, 
(iii) real exchange-rate appreciation and currency 
misalignment, (iv) high prices for local assets 
(shares, bonds, real estate), (v) high levels of 
household borrowing relative to wages and profits and
(vi) falling interest rates with substantial increases 
in the money supply. The longer the run-up and 
the deeper the economy goes into these areas of 
vulnerability, the more severe will be the potential “ 
financieristic” trap for the authorities and the less the 
chances of escaping from it without experiencing an 
economically and socially ruinous shock.
Different combinations of the variables referred 
to were present in the Latin American crises of 
1982, 1995 and 1999. In emerging economies, 
external shocks associated with capital flows or 
the terms of  trade have tended to be long drawn-
out processes characterized by gradually mounting 
vulnerabilities. Since these processes have gone 
with steadily rising asset prices, however, financial 
operators have reaped growing profits despite 
burgeoning macroeconomic imbalances.
The current crisis, originating in the United States, 
shares a number of  these sources of  vulnerability 
with emerging economies, such as excessively low 
interest rates, property price bubbles, risky incentives 
to lending because of  the high level of  liquidity, 
high levels of leverage and procyclical risk ratings. 
However, there are substantial differences in that the 
United States is the issuer of the leading international 
currency and it was its markets that first created 
the channels of  expansion, involving a profusion 
of  financial engineering mechanisms, which were 
then exported. These channels, we repeat, were 
characterized by a great lack of risk transparency 
and by very high levels of leverage.
Subprime mortgage lending was the trigger for 
the crisis but not the main source of vulnerability, 
since otherwise its effects would have been confined 
to that segment of the United States economy. The 
sector clearly underwent an unsustainable boom 
based on the faulty perception that high prices would 
continue to rise indefinitely (a feature reminiscent 
of many of the situations that have led to shocks in 
Latin America and the Caribbean), but at the same 
time many other imbalances of financial origin were 
in the making in the United States in particular and 
the Anglo-Saxon world in general.
(i) First, mortgage market bubbles spread around 
the globe,3 although always with essentially 
“micro” implications, as they were not sufficient 
in themselves to unleash a crisis in a world whose 
gdp was in excess of US$ 60 trillion.
(ii) Financial innovation had gone worldwide; it paved 
the way for massive frauds with repercussions in 
the real economy, but it also had very procyclical 
effects on expectations.
(iii) Many investors were operating with extremely 
high levels of leverage. This might be justifiable 
in the case of legitimate producers and users of 
products who have the backing of real activities, 
but not in that of  speculators operating with 
minimal capital.
(iv) Stock markets surged to heights incompatible 
with real growth in net profits, which are what 
ultimately underpin share prices.
At the macroeconomic level, the United States 
economy ran a growing current-account deficit from 
the early 1990s onward (see figure 1). In an initial 
stage lasting until 2000, the increase in the external 
deficit was due to private-sector activities. Although 
this deficit adjusted after the 2001 recession, the 
government began a process of increasing the fiscal 
deficit which lasted until 2003, peaking at almost 5% 
of gdp. Between 2003 and 2006, the public sector 
began to adjust again, but private-sector exuberance 
caused the already large current-account deficit to 
widen, and by 2006 it stood at 6% of gdp.
In parallel, long-term interest rates in the United 
States fell for several years until they reached historic 
lows (which have been shown to be even lower than 
the equilibrium rate), a trend that intensified from 
2002 as demand for United States Treasury securities 
rose strongly (see figure 2).
A similar trend was followed by real estate 
assets, whose prices almost trebled (191% increase) 
between 1996 and the peak of mid-2006 (see figure 3);
housing prices grew at double-digit annual rates for 
80 consecutive months, from late 1999 to mid-2006 
(see table 1).
As already noted, stock markets were central to 
the bubble in many countries, as they also displayed 
an unsustainable upward trend (see figure 4). Natural 
resource prices, meanwhile, rose exorbitantly; with 
time it became clear that speculators had progressively 
been dominating the derivatives markets for these 
3 There were also real-estate price booms in many countries.
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FIGURE 1
United States: macroeconomic imbalances
(Percentages of gdp)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  International Monetary Fund data.
FIGURE 2
Long-term interest rates in the developed world
(Nominal returns on 10-year government bonds)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York, the European Central Bank, the 
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FIGURE 3
United States: home price index
(12-month rate of change)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the S&P/Case-Shiller index.
TABLE 1
United States: home price index
 Level Dec.-Dec. Annual average
 (Jan. 2000=100) change (%) change (%)
1989 81 6.1 0.0
1990 82 -3.6 0.8
1991 78 -1.8 -4.2
1992 78 -1.7 -0.7
1993 76 -1.3 -1.7
1994 77 1.7 0.7
1995 77 -0.4 0.2
1996 78 1.9 0.9
1997 80 5.4 3.4
1998 87 9.1 8.4
1999 95 10.8 9.4
2000 107 14.1 12.9
2001 120 8.9 11.8
2002 133 15.0 11.1
2003 151 13.4 13.5
2004 179 18.7 18.3
2005 209 15.9 16.9
2006 225 0.2 7.4
2007 215 -9.7 -4.4
2008 182 -19.1 -15.4
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the 
S&P/Case-Shiller index.
now stands is characterized by a severe deficiency 
of  macroeconomic and financial regulation and a 
striking imbalance between the voices, opinions and 
interests that are taken into account in designing 































































































































commodities, and this was borne out by the rapid 
fall in prices when the cycle turned downward (see 
figure 5 and table 2).4 There were obvious symptoms 
of bubble behaviour, not only in the United States 
real estate sector but in a range of activities around 
the world. Furthermore, the procyclical behaviour of 
the risk rating agencies worsened the imbalances by 
inflating financial agents’ expectations.
It is striking that, in general, evaluations by the 
risk rating agencies, which ought to be contributing 
to the sustainability and transparency of agents and 
markets, actually made the imbalances worse. They 
continued to be highly procyclical, just as they were 
in the run-up to the Asian crisis (Reisen, 2003).
The world is now faced with the urgent need 
to resolve the greatest crisis since the 1930s, whose 
effects on the real economy were only beginning 
to be discerned in late 2008. Looking beyond 
the corrections already made and the numerous 
downward revisions to economic growth forecasts 
that will be seen in the different countries, this is an 
opportunity for reforms to change the speculative 
and untransparent bias of  financial activities. 
Without question, the globalization process as it 
4 As a top executive in a mining company put it, the expansion of 
the copper derivatives market was increasingly driven by operators 
who had no connection or familiarity with the product. Thus, the 
price rose from 60 cents in 2002 to 400 cents in 2008, before falling 
back to 130 cents in the latter part of that year.
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FIGURE 4
real stock market indices in the developed world
(Deflated by the United States cpi, December 2004 = 100)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  financial information from Bloomberg.
FIGURE 5
Commodity price indices, 2003-2008
(2003 = 100)




 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General index 100 120 134 175 197 250
Food 100 114 122 145 158 228
Oilseed products 100 113 102 108 165 225
Agricultural commodities 100 113 118 136 151 185
Metals and minerals 100 141 178 285 321 352
Oil 100 131 185 222 246 353
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III
Development financing
and the Monterrey Consensus
In 2002, the international community held a summit 
whose purpose was to agree on the measures needed 
to correct the path of financial globalization. Critics 
of  that path had argued that what was occurring 
was the globalization of volatility and that the large 
increase in financial flows had contributed little and 
poorly to the financing of  development (Ffrench-
Davis and Ocampo, 2001). Trends at the time 
indicated that the world was moving too slowly to 
attain the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs).
The Monterrey Consensus of  the United 
Nations International Conference on Financing for 
Development represented a major step forward, as it 
recognized the biases and failures in the international 
financial system that were obstructing or discouraging 
development (growth and equity alike) and drew up 
a set of  relevant and sensible proposals which the 
representatives of the signatory countries undertook 
to implement gradually. Since then there have been 
some excellent evaluations of progress and setbacks 
in their application, particularly those prepared by 
the United Nations Secretariat.
This section will first review some of the aspects 
encompassed by the Monterrey Consensus and 
the progress made since the agreement was signed, 
including certain issues that arose after the development 
financing summit, and will then briefly examine the 
amended Declaration of the Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development held in 
Doha, Qatar, in late 2008 to review application of 
the Monterrey Consensus.5
5 The principal documents considered were: (i) Monterrey Consensus 
of the International Conference on Financing for Development 
(United Nations, 2002), (ii) Follow-up to and Implementation of 
the Outcome of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development: Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations, 
2007a), (iii) Summary by the President of the General Assembly of 
1. The Monterrey Consensus: evaluation
 and follow-up
(a) A selective evaluation
The Monterrey Consensus represented a substantive 
step forward in the international development agenda. 
It complemented the international agreements on the 
subject, including the Millennium Development Goals, 
since the attainment of these goals is closely bound 
up not only with official development assistance and 
domestic social policies but also with the economic 
performance of developing countries.
The Monterrey Consensus recognized the crucial 
role of  investment and its financing for economic 
growth, at a time when there was a strong fashion 
in economics for across-the-board liberalization, 
including more liquid financial flows. The fashion 
had taken as given that physical capital did not count 
for much in development and that financial flows, 
then being increasingly liberalized, contributed to 
macroeconomic stability and development.
The agreement signed at Monterrey marked a 
shift towards a pragmatic approach. It stressed the 
need to maintain “adequate” levels of  productive 
investment, which actually needed to become much 
higher in most developing economies for their 
living standards to converge with those of  richer 
countries. Increased productive investment required 
comprehensive financial development, including 
the High-Level Dialogue on Financing for Development (United 
Nations, 2007b), (iv) Report on the Tenth Session of the Committee 
for Development Policy of the United Nations (United Nations, 
2008a) and (v) Doha Declaration on Financing for Development 
(United Nations, 2008b). Use has also been made of  material 
prepared by the author for the Financing for Development Office 
of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
in preparation for the 2008 Doha Conference.
As President Obama rightly said, it is time to 
hear the voices of Main Street instead of the voices 
of  Wall Street. As we have repeatedly argued in 
relation to economic policy, “productivism” has 
to replace “financierism” (Ffrench-Davis, 2006) if  
the market is to serve the needs of  development 
financing and growth with equity, an issue that is 
examined in section III.
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a significant strengthening of  long-term segments 
of capital markets and the creation or completion 
in domestic capital markets of  segments geared 
towards small and medium-sized firms (smes) and 
other excluded sectors. In fact, in its concern for 
equity (and fulfilment of  the mdgs), in several 
paragraphs the Monterrey Consensus repeatedly 
underlines the essential role belonging to the 
creation or completion of sme financing mechanisms 
(paragraphs 17, 18 and 24, for instance). This point 
represents a crucial link between economic growth 
and equity, since middle- and low-income agents are 
major providers of productive employment and such 
mechanisms are needed to give them more effective 
market access.
This comprehensive pro-development approach 
includes the issue of  migrant remittances. Besides 
the traditional proposal of  reducing remittance 
costs, the Monterrey Consensus (paragraph 18) 
advances the innovative view that remittances could 
serve to “securitize” loans for development-oriented 
investments by recipient families. This is one of the 
measures that would permit a significant expansion 
of microcredit.
Consequently, the countries signing the 
Monterrey Consensus “invite banks and other 
financial institutions, in developing countries as well as 
developed countries, to foster innovative development 
financing approaches” (paragraph 23). Similarly, 
they undertake to “support new public/private sector 
financing mechanisms” (paragraph 24).
The document, with laudable foresight, 
recognizes the importance of “sound macroeconomic 
policies”, but again with a pragmatic approach 
(paragraph 14). Along with due concern for price 
stability and fiscal balances, it stresses that their 
goals should also include full employment, poverty 
eradication and sustainable external balances, the 
latter requiring “an appropriate exchange rate 
regime”. When it comes to maintaining “adequate 
levels of productive investment” (paragraph 10), the 
Monterrey Consensus identifies a need for consistent 
macroeconomic policies. Evidently, “consistency 
and soundness” must be understood in the sense 
highlighted in this paragraph.
Several paragraphs are devoted to discussing 
financial crises. The Monterrey Consensus gives 
“priority to the identification and prevention of 
potential crises (…) with particular attention to 
short-term capital flows and their impact” (paragraph 
55). It is recognized that domestic macroeconomic 
balances can be destroyed by depressed export 
revenues (paragraph 37) and by contagion from 
financial crises. It then “underlines the need to 
ensure that the international financial institutions, 
including the International Monetary Fund, have a 
suitable array of financial facilities and resources to 
respond in a timely and appropriate way” (paragraph 
59) to situations of this type, before adding that “the 
need for special drawing rights allocations should be 
kept under review”.
The document recognizes the International 
Monetary Fund (imf) Compensatory Financing 
Facility and Contingent Credit Line as renewed and 
valid safeguards, but adds that the signatory nations 
mean to “continue to assess its effectiveness” (paragraph 
37). It is further stated that even if  burden-sharing 
can be made fair and unsustainable debts restructured 
in a timely and efficient manner, “such a mechanism 
should not preclude emergency financing in times of 
crisis” (paragraph 60). More precisely, it is argued 
that there is a need for compensatory financing to 
prevent crises from worsening or at least to mitigate 
the deterioration.
Lastly, mention should be made of  another 
innovative source of financing, which is the agreement 
to strengthen international tax cooperation and 
efforts to combat tax evasion, money laundering, 
flows of  illicit funds, terrorism financing and 
corruption (paragraphs 64 and 65). The implication 
is that transparency and cooperation contribute to 
enhanced public expenditure efficiency in developing 
nations and to increased tax revenues that can be 
used to finance domestic development and meet the 
Millennium Development Goals.
(b) Follow-up and implementation
There have been substantive annual follow-up 
reports by the Secretary-General of  the United 
Nations, covering each of the six chapters of this global 
agreement on financing for development. In addition, 
the General Assembly has held High-level Dialogues 
on Financing for Development culminating in the 
Follow-up International Conference on Financing for 
Development tasked with reviewing the application 
of the Monterrey Consensus, which was held in Doha 
in late 2008, in the midst of the global financial crisis. 
Here we examine some aspects that merit particular 
attention in the Report of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations on Follow-up to and Implementation 
of the Outcome of the International Conference on 
Financing for Development (United Nations, 2007a) 
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and in the Summary of the High-level Dialogue on 
Financing for Development presented by the President 
of the General Assembly (United Nations, 2007b). 
A selective review will be undertaken as an input for 
the discussion of innovative financing sources which 
will be the focus of section IV.
The follow-up report by the Secretary-General 
notes “considerable advances in some areas and 
modest progress, stagnation or retrogression in 
others”, in a general context of “widespread concerns 
that the fruits of development and growth are not 
fairly distributed and (…) a growing trend towards a 
higher concentration of income and wealth” (United 
Nations, 2007a).
The Report makes use of new financial market 
research and knowledge that has become available 
since 2002 on the issues covered by the Monterrey 
Consensus. In particular, it expands on many aspects of 
that document, complementing it with a proposal for 
a consistent approach to the development of policies 
oriented towards the goals laid down by the signatory 
countries. The progress made on the understanding 
of  macroeconomic matters in this sixth follow-up 
report is of great importance, as it moves decisively 
in the direction of a macroeconomic approach aimed 
at stimulating both local and foreign productive 
investment in developing countries (paragraphs 
17-20).6 It stresses the necessity of  “employment-
oriented macroeconomic policy” in relation to both 
labour and capital, i.e., the effort to narrow the gap 
between actual output and potential gdp, following 
a development macroeconomics approach.
In a notably clear statement, the document 
argues: “Countries should seek to expand their tools 
for sound macroeconomic policy, including effective 
capital flow management (…) and macroprudential 
mechanisms, the establishment of  countercyclical 
funds (…) and the enhanced use of their tax systems 
to manage booms and busts.” This paragraph 
(number 18) represents outstandingly pragmatic, 
down-to-earth progress towards a policy-oriented 
approach informed by the most recent research on 
the procyclical evolution of international financial 
6 These proposals converge with the arguments we have repeatedly 
put forward about the need to correct the macroeconomic approach 
prevailing in Latin America. This is characterized by a neoliberal 
or “financieristic” bias, as compared to a macroeconomy geared 
towards sustained development. See Ffrench-Davis (2006, chapter 
III) for an analysis of  “financieristic” and “productivistic” 
macroeconomic approaches.
markets and the shortcomings of the macroeconomic 
approaches more in fashion (Ocampo, 2007).
The Report of  the Secretary-General stresses 
the need “to provide stronger oversight of financial 
market activities”, arguing that “perhaps most 
urgently, international and national authorities 
should collaborate to strengthen the transparency 
and regulation of  hedge funds and derivative 
instruments” (paragraph 56). The stress laid on 
this in the report long predates the eruption of 
the subprime crisis and the intensification of  the 
speculative component in the climbing price trend 
of several commodities.
Ment ion  i s  a l so  made  o f  “countr i e s 
internationally perceived as successful globalizers”, 
for which “managing the boom periods of capital 
flows is critical. In this respect, countercyclical 
regulations and instruments should be given utmost 
consideration” (paragraph 54). The document 
considers several issues related to the international 
financial architecture and the slow progress or 
setbacks in this area by comparison with other 
forces of  globalization.7 One of  them is the fact 
that “the international community has not yet 
succeeded in developing some broadly acceptable 
form of contingent liquidity (…) to provide financial 
support to countries with market access that may face 
potential capital account crises” (paragraph 119). Just 
a few lines before (paragraph 118), mention had been 
made of the need for “a comprehensive reform of 
the international monetary system”, particularly with 
respect to international reserve currencies.
A sharp distinction is made in the report 
between short-term financial flows and long-term 
investments, since it has become increasingly evident 
that the latter tend to be more closely associated with 
productive activity than the former. It is emphasized 
that the effects of  capital inflows on economic 
growth also depend on the quality of  domestic 
intermediation and exchange-rate policy. These two 
factors are mentioned several times (in paragraph 
104, for instance). This reiteration is welcome, since 
the currently fashionable approaches have failed 
dramatically: intermediaries have not channelled the 
increased financial funds into investment projects but 
into consumption and existing assets, which became 
7 The report underlines several other issues, such as environmental 
taxes that could help mitigate the destruction of the environment 
and provide financing for research and adaptation, and resource-
use taxes or royalties.
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overpriced as a result, while at the same time capital 
inflows in general have tended to lead to outlier 
exchange-rates. Consequently, developing economies 
ought to implement active exchange-rate policies 
that are consistent with the evolution of domestic 
productivity, while focusing financial reforms on 
the development of long-term and non-traditional 
segments of domestic capital markets.
As already mentioned, the Monterrey Consensus 
introduced the issue of illicit flows and tax evasion. 
The Secretary-General’s report goes further with a 
discussion on “expanding fiscal space” and fighting 
tax evasion. In fact, a fairly standard characteristic of 
developing countries is a strikingly low tax burden. 
As a consequence, they exhibit a limited capacity to 
finance infrastructure and human capital investment 
and to ensure the efficiency of public expenditure. 
Several well-argued paragraphs are devoted to tax 
and budgetary matters (paragraphs 26-36) and this 
issue is returned to at the end of the report, which 
features substantive proposals (paragraphs 124-126) 
focused on the role that could be played by the new 
(or reformed) United Nations Committee of Experts 
on International Cooperation in Tax Matters.
It should be stressed that the report explicitly 
mentions “innovative sources of  finance [that 
have been] largely brought into the mainstream” 
(paragraphs 93-96). It will be recalled below that at 
the 2005 High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixtieth 
session of the General Assembly, or World Summit, 
79 heads of State and government subscribed to a 
Declaration acknowledging the value of promoting 
innovative development financing.
Approval of the Doha Declaration on Financing 
for Development was beset by great difficulties because 
of opposition to the Secretariat proposal that was 
led by the delegation of the outgoing United States 
government. For all that, the final text, even after 
being watered down in intensive negotiations, did 
reiterate the positions of the Monterrey Consensus 
and the determination to step up compliance with 
the commitments entered into when that document 
was signed.
The following steps forward may be mentioned. 
First, the agreement to convene a conference at the 
highest level in 2009 on the world financial and 
economic crisis and its effects on development. This 
implies acceptance that the United Nations and its 
Member States are entitled to a say on an issue that 
some countries want confined within the exclusive 
remit of  the imf  and World Bank. Second, the 
recognition that the architecture of the international 
economic system also requires corrections if  it 
is to meet the needs of  middle-income countries. 
Third, the explicit reference, following protracted 
debate between the delegations, to the importance 
of  “innovative financing sources”, with special 
recognition for the Action against Hunger and 
Poverty Initiative. Section IV briefly details some 
of the progress made in this field.
IV
review of progress and emerging issues
Several innovative forms of  financing have been 
proposed to help countries implement equitable social 
and economic policies in the effort to bring about 
“globalization with a human face”. There is a growing 
determination to move from words to fulfilment of 
commitments and effective action, particularly as 
regards attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals. For this to happen, it will be essential to 
thoroughly overhaul the workings of the financial 
markets. This is far more obvious now, given the deep 
crisis the world is going through, than in 2002 when 
the Monterrey Consensus was approved. In recent 
years, concrete measures have been adopted in an 
encouraging number of cases, while in others there are 
now solid technical foundations that will eventually 
help to generate political support for future action. In 
particular, we wish to highlight the progress made in 
the field of what is known as innovative financing.
The developing world needs more resources for 
productive and social development, plus international 
commitments to ensure that people gain from the 
potential benefits of globalization rather than being 
mere passive victims of its negative features. Efforts 
are needed to ensure that a growing number of people 
become “winners” in terms of social and economic 
well-being.
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1. Action against Hunger and Poverty
In 2004, determined to contribute to the fulfilment of 
the internationally agreed Millennium Development 
Goals  and the Monterrey Consensus,  the 
representatives of a group of countries from North 
and South launched a partnership for development 
and solidarity geared towards identifying innovative 
sources of funding to help promote public goods, 
boost economic development and combat public 
“bads” such as hunger and poverty.
Action against Hunger and Poverty was created 
by the presidents of Brazil, Chile and France, with 
the support of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations; the group was subsequently joined by the 
heads of  State of  Spain, Germany, Algeria and 
South Africa. Funding raised by means of innovative 
financing mechanisms would be used to set up 
projects to facilitate the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals. As part of  this North-South 
partnership, which was strongly supported by the 
United Nations, the heads of State of the member 
countries of  the initiative appointed a technical 
working group to study possible mechanisms for 
financing the fight against hunger and poverty. Its 
proposals are summarized in box 1.
BOX 1
innovative sources of financing for action 
against hunger and poverty
Solidarity levies on air travel
Reduction of  tax evasion, particularly via tax havens
Increasing the benefits of  migrant remittances (linking with 
microcredit)
Currency transaction tax (ctt)
Taxation of  arms trade
Creation of  International Financial Facility (iff)
Issuance of  special drawing rights (sdrs) for countercyclical 
financing of  development
Voluntary contributions through credit cards
Socially responsible investing or “ethical funds”
Solidarity lotteries
Source: Action against Hunger and Poverty proposals, presented 
to the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 
September 2004 and 2005.
These proposals were presented at the United 
Nations in September 2004 and were supported by 
the representatives of  numerous countries. They 
called for work to continue and for the results of 
the activities carried out to be presented at the 
World Summit of September 2005 in which progress 
towards the 2015 Millennium Development Goals 
was to be reviewed. The 2005 New York Declaration 
on Innovative Sources of Financing for Development 
was prepared by Action against Hunger and Poverty 
with the idea of steering globalization away from its 
more dehumanizing and procyclical aspects, raising 
awareness of the issues and ensuring that speeches 
made at international summits were followed up with 
tangible action. Prepared by the technical working 
group, the Declaration was endorsed by 79 heads of 
State. Concrete action was also announced during 
the Summit, as summarized further on.
As part of  the Action against Hunger and 
Poverty Initiative, the Pilot Group on Solidarity 
Contributions for Development was set up in 2006. 
Including the seven countries named above, this 
group comprises 55 countries from both North and 
South with very different levels of development. The 
representatives of all these countries have expressed 
a willingness to identify and apply pro-development 
levies and to contribute by generating specific 
funding to the struggle against “public bads” such 
as tax evasion and financial crises.8
These two groups of nations share a comprehensive 
approach that pursues the globalization of solidarity, 
i.e., globalization with a human face that brings the 
benefits of development to all countries and all their 
middle- and low-income inhabitants. The approach 
is pro-growth and pro-equity as regards both sources 
of funding and the uses it is put to.
The group has made tangible progress, and this 
was reflected in the proposals presented at the World 
Summit of September 2005, which included a levy on 
airline tickets. The pilot project for the international 
air-ticket solidarity contribution was officially started 
in 2006, with proceeds to go to the fight against 
hiv/aids, tuberculosis and malaria. Chile and France 
(since March and July 2006, respectively) were the 
first countries to introduce airport fees earmarked 
for this solidarity initiative.
8 The Pilot Group on Solidarity Contributions for Development 
has addressed several issues besides those covered by the Action 
against Hunger and Poverty Initiative. They include reviewing 
the solidarity levy on air travel, issuing special drawing rights as 
a countercyclical financing mechanism to deal with financial and 
trade instability in developing countries, introducing a modest tax 
on financial or currency transactions, repatriating illicit capital 
outflows, enhancing the potential role of  the carbon market, 
linking migrant workers’ remittances to microcredit in recipient 
households, stepping up efforts to combat tax fraud and tax evasion, 
implementing a digital solidarity contribution and promoting the 
Digital Solidarity Fund.
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The project designed to deal with the three 
pandemics mentioned, the International Drug Purchase 
Facility (unitaid), was set up by the governments 
of  Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United 
Kingdom and is supported by the Clinton Foundation 
and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Thirty-four 
countries are currently members of unitaid and are 
contributing to the financing of its activities, while 
several others are considering applying such a levy 
or using other sources of sustainable financing for 
this purpose.
To avoid bureaucracy and duplication in 
administrative costs, unitaid operates through the 
World Health Organization. This is a key feature of 
the Facility and one that ought to be foremost in 
the design and identification of sources and uses of 
financing, given how many funds and institutions 
experience a shortage of financing.
hiv/aids, tuberculosis and malaria are major 
causes of hunger and poverty in the households they 
affect. All three are critical factors in the progress and 
setbacks of the development process. In addition to 
fighting these diseases directly, unitaid also aims to 
improve the functioning of markets for therapeutic 
drugs in order to lower their cost and raise their 
quality, not only for the direct beneficiaries but also 
for the health systems of  developing countries in 
general. From this perspective, it benefits poor and 
middle-income countries alike.
This innovative source of  financing has the 
following advantages: (i) air passenger transport is an 
activity that has benefited greatly from globalization; 
(ii) generally speaking, air travel is a comparatively 
undertaxed sector (in respect of  fuel and vat, for 
instance); (iii) the air transport levy is progressive, 
as air travellers usually belong to the upper-income 
brackets and are thus quite well placed to share the 
benefits of their position with the rest of the world; 
(iv) it is an easy-to-collect national levy, involving 
negligible bureaucracy in cases where airport fees or 
ticket taxes are already in force.
The International Finance Facility (iff) 
proposed by the United Kingdom opened the way 
to another pilot programme. In November 2006, 
the International Finance Facility for Immunisation 
(iffim) was founded under the leadership of  the 
United Kingdom with financial backing from eight 
countries (Brazil, France, Italy, Norway, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). iffim 
is to fund child immunization programmes and 
strengthen health systems in the world’s 70 poorest 
countries. Future legally binding grants from 
participating donor countries constitute the financial 
basis for an iffim bond issuance programme that 
will take place over 10 years.
In February 2007, a pilot advance market 
commitment (amc) for pneumococcal vaccines was 
launched at the instigation of Italy and with financial 
backing from five countries (Canada, Italy, Norway, 
Russian Federation and United Kingdom) and the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. This amc aims 
to accelerate the development of new pneumococcal 
vaccines, specifically for developing countries, by 
guaranteeing to subsidize their future purchase, if  
they are successfully developed.
Several concrete initiatives have been undertaken 
to develop more accurate data on migrant remittances 
and promote the sharing of information and best 
practices to reduce transfer costs. They also aim 
to “securitize” such remittances, in an effort to 
foster development by promoting recipient families’ 
access to local financial and banking institutions. 
Cooperative efforts are being made by migrant 
communities, local and central governments in origin 
and destination countries, banks, transfer operators 
and civil society.9
2. Two ongoing initiatives
We shall now turn our attention to two specific issues. 
Progress has been made on both of them in technical 
design, and both have pro-development attributes, while 
recent events have given them a renewed urgency.
(a) Fighting tax evasion internationally
Hunger and poverty are also associated with 
weak tax systems, not least because of tax evasion 
by means of  tax havens. Consequently, efforts to 
combat tax evasion could become a major source 
of innovative financing for development. The issue 
has aroused renewed interest now that a number of 
emblematic cases have come to light in developed 
economies. Although evasion and flows of illegally 
acquired funds are a global concern, they affect 
developing countries with particular severity because 
they deprive them of essential resources that could 
be used to finance public services and investment.
9 For many developing countries, migrants’ remittances became the 
main source of capital from abroad. Unlike loans, furthermore, which 
flow out of the recipient country upon repayment, these funds are 
irreversible once they have been transferred. These financial flows 
fell substantially, however, when the current crisis began.
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The Pilot Group on Solidarity Contributions 
for Development has established a task force, led by 
Norway, to develop proposals and plans of action for 
combating flows of illicit funds. In the more specific 
field of  tax evasion, the Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development held in 
Doha to review implementation of the Monterrey 
Consensus was used as an opportunity to launch 
an initiative, orchestrated by the Government of 
Germany with support from Chile, Norway and 
Uganda, to develop concrete projects in this area 
and coordinate their work with international 
organizations and civil society.
It is a matter of serious concern that a large share 
of the profits from the financial flows and capital gains 
of globalization are untaxed or undertaxed because 
of tax avoidance or evasion. Tax havens are one of 
the means by which this inequity is perpetuated. 
Tax evasion, furthermore, is bound up with money 
laundering, corruption and terrorism financing: three 
pervasive “public bads”.
Tax evasion has an ethical dimension, as it 
penalizes legitimate, transparent, unsecretive investors 
who duly pay their taxes, while benefiting those who 
engage in tax avoidance and other activities funded 
with money from illegal practices or allowed by tax 
loopholes or policy failures. Furthermore, tax evasion 
is very unfair to honest taxpayers. Permissive policies 
in the face of booming financial flows, together with 
weak or non-existent oversight, have allowed this flaw 
in globalization to develop further. It is well known 
that a substantial portion of the resources which leak 
out of the tax systems of countries in both North and 
South are sheltered in tax havens.
Given the weaknesses of tax systems in developing 
countries, it is essential to strengthen their ability to 
raise public revenue by adopting measures to prevent 
evasion perpetrated through tax havens. The United 
Nations Committee of  Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters can play an important 
role here. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development has also been working 
on the issue of tax evasion and tax havens, though 
any progress achieved would be limited to its member 
countries. Collaboration between the two institutions 
could help in concrete decision-making to combat 
international tax evasion and improve the tax systems 
of developing countries.
Effective solutions to this problem require 
collective measures. There are several initiatives that 
could be explored, such as a mandate for the United 
Nations Committee of  Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters to address international 
tax evasion and the preparation of a code of conduct 
on this issue. A strengthened Committee secretariat 
would be required, with full political support and the 
resources needed to develop its technical proposals.
(b) Countercyclical mechanisms in the world 
economic slowdown
The volume of financial flows has grown with 
remarkable speed in the past couple of decades. The 
magnitude of purely financial flows overshadows all 
other international transactions, including official 
development assistance, greenfield foreign direct 
investment, trade credit and migrant remittances.
The financial markets are currently experiencing 
frequent “mood swings” affecting, for example, 
stock market price expectations and exchange 
rates, so that funds flowing towards a particular 
geographical market can suddenly be switched to 
another. Consequently, a developing economy can 
move overnight from a situation in which there 
is an oversupply of  foreign currency to one of  a 
severe drought. Such “mood swings” in financial 
and currency markets are felt very strongly in the 
real economy, i.e., in output, employment, profits 
and tax revenues. In fact, recessive macroeconomic 
disequilibria in emerging economies can strongly 
affect developing countries, as happened with the 
East Asian crisis.
Crises triggered by external shocks affect the 
situation of businesses, which experience sudden falls 
in the demand for their products. This in turn affects 
employment: as a result of contagion from the East 
Asian crisis, for example, the average unemployment 
rate in Latin America rose by 3 to 4 percentage 
points from 1997 to 1999-2003. Thus, crises weaken 
the producers of  wealth – businesses and workers 
– and depress the economy. An output gap usually 
opens up between potential gdp and actual gdp, 
implying a drop in actual total factor productivity, 
permanently foregone gdp and a recessionary 
dynamic that deters investment in physical and 
human capital. In other words, the present situation 
and future prospects deteriorate while development 
is undermined and, with it, the prospects of attaining 
the Millennium Development Goals.
The Asian crisis and its far-reaching contagion 
effects spurred fruitful analytical and empirical 
work, whose results are reflected in the contents of 
the documents referred to. In the particular case of 
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Latin America, it led to recessionary effects lasting 
all of six years. Between 1998 and 2003, the region’s 
gdp increased by just 1.4% a year, which was less 
than the rate of  population increase. Forfeiting 
growth in jobs, wages and profits for six years 
exacted an enormous cost. There could hardly be a 
more wasteful use of resources than to allocate them 
to unemployment. To rectify the situation, national 
macroeconomic policy design and the international 
architecture need a thorough overhaul.
Action against Hunger and Poverty and 
the Pilot Group on Solidarity Contributions 
for Development have developed proposals for 
strengthening countercyclical mechanisms and 
financing them through issues of  special drawing 
rights (sdrs) by the International Monetary Fund. 
The United Nations Committee for Development 
Policy made convergent proposals in its Report on 
the Tenth Session (United Nations, 2008a). The 
analysis that follows is based mainly on the latter.
External shocks, transmitted through the trade 
and capital accounts, usually have large negative 
economic and social effects on developing economies. 
The initial effects on key macroeconomic and social 
variables can spread to the entire economy in the 
form of reduced government spending and private 
investment, lower wages, higher unemployment 
and thus greater poverty. Installed economic 
capacity is underused and some resources are 
foregone for ever. Therefore, economic shocks can 
impede or delay progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals.
There is consequently a need for a development-
friendly international financial architecture, including 
deeply reformed countercyclical official credit facilities 
for low- and middle-income economies when they are 
adversely affected by external shocks such as trade 
and financial crises or by worsening natural disasters 
associated with climate change.
As studies by the International Monetary 
Fund and its Independent Evaluation Office 
report, there is an urgent need to improve existing 
compensatory financing mechanisms and design 
new ones where gaps exist. This urgency arises, 
first, because the global economic outlook for 2008-
2009 has turned gloomy and developing countries 
are likely to be highly vulnerable to a slowdown 
in developed economies. Second, the need for 
action has been made even more pressing by large 
increases in oil and food prices, which have severely 
affected countries that are net importers of  these 
commodities and provoked a great deal of  social 
discontent in several countries.
In recent years, some countries have built up large 
cushions of reserves and fiscal resources as a buffer or 
“self-insurance” against external shocks. However, high 
levels of reserves entail large costs, mainly in terms of 
the opportunity costs of productive investment foregone 
and direct financial losses stemming from relatively low 
interest earnings on reserve assets. The depreciation 
of the United States dollar has further added to the 
financial costs of holding reserves, as many countries 
hold them in dollar-denominated assets.
Official compensatory flows can play a crucial 
role in sparing developing countries the unnecessary 
costs entailed by holding such high levels of 
international reserves and, most importantly, in 
helping them to avoid contractions in economic 
activity and productive investment that go beyond 
what is required to restore real macroeconomic 
equilibria.10 Economic contractions have been quite 
frequent and have resulted in underutilization of 
present potential gdp and the loss of  prospective 
growth. In this regard, improved compensatory 
flows can potentially be a very effective mechanism 
for protecting economic growth and the incomes of 
poorer people in the affected countries, both now 
and in the near future.
There are currently a number of  major 
compensatory financing mechanisms, but either they 
are limited in coverage and volume or too narrowly 
defined, or funding is released too late or is subject 
to conditionality that is inappropriate given the 
nature of external shocks.
In view of  the worsening global economic 
outlook, its implications for developing countries 
and the inadequacy of  existing compensatory 
finance instruments, there is an urgent need for a 
reformed compensatory financing architecture so 
that official liquidity and assistance can be provided 
to developing countries suffering the negative impact 
10 A crucial condition of macroeconomic equilibrium is for potential 
or installed gdp to be actually used; for this to be sustainable, the 
“right macro-prices” are needed. It must be stressed that these 
remarks apply to real economies that are “well-behaved” or have 
already corrected their main imbalances. Evidently, economies with 
extremely appreciated exchange rates and large external and fiscal 
deficits (after duly counting international solidarity revenues) will 
need to engineer significant drops in aggregate demand and large 
devaluations. We recall that, recently, for five or six years, several 
Latin American countries recorded large output gaps (with actual 
gdp well below potential gdp) and experienced major imbalances 
in the real macroeconomy during that prolonged period.
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V
Conclusions
Capital flows have great potential to contribute to 
economic development. However, the transitory 
nature of financial transactions and the incomplete 
state of existing instruments and institutions have 
helped make financial markets some of the worse-
functioning in the whole market economy system. 
Financial flows tend to exhibit wild swings, spells 
of excessive optimism or pessimism and prolonged 
periods of outlying domestic prices and ratios (Rodrik, 
1998; Stiglitz, 2000); these have been characteristics 
of exchange rates, stock and real-estate prices, and 
interest rates. Consequently, better information, 
regulation of the financial sector and comprehensive 
but prudent macroeconomic management of 
financial flows are desirable public goods. This is why 
governments have a responsibility for the behaviour 
of  supply (in the case of  industrialized countries) 
and demand (in the case of developing countries), 
both coordinated where necessary by international 
organizations. Inaction can carry a heavy cost, as was 
demonstrated during the debt crisis, the 1994 Mexico 
crisis, the Asian crisis of  1997 and the prolonged 
stagnation of  the countries of  Latin America in 
1998-2003 (Ffrench-Davis, 2006, chapter VIII).
Given the growing imbalances produced by 
globalization, there is a pressing need to restructure 
the international financial architecture in response to 
profound shifts in the global economy. As the Report 
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 
Follow-up to and Implementation of the Outcome 
of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development (United Nations, 2007a) emphasizes, 
and as the Summary of  the High-level Dialogue 
on Financing for Development presented by the 
President of the General Assembly (United Nations, 
2007b) reaffirms, instability is a pernicious feature of 
today’s system. The voices of developing countries 
must be heard and serious measures taken to prevent 
and respond to financial crises (including the proposal 
for reformed countercyclical mechanisms).
A tougher challenge is actually to generate the 
right conditions for redirecting potential savings 
towards development. The following observations 
need to be made. First, international finance has 
generally become undertaxed at the expense of the 
real economy, which is forced to cover the revenue 
shortfall or lack of public investment for productive 
development. This is particularly prejudicial to less 
mobile factors of  production (small businesses 
of  external shocks. To be effective, liquidity must 
be adequate and have the attributes of  “speedy 
disbursement, scale proportionate to the shock and 
low conditionality” (United Nations, 2008a).
To finance a significant improvement in the 
volume and quality of  compensatory financing, 
bearing in mind the arguments in favour of a gradual 
move towards a global reserve currency, issuance of 
special drawing rights (sdrs) should be reinstated. 
A new reform would allow the imf  to use them to 
finance a significant increase in the availability of 
compensatory financing. The current prospect of 
downward adjustments in economic activity and 
financial turmoil represents an appropriate context 
for a new allocation of sdrs with a countercyclical 
role, with a view to progressing cautiously and 
gradually towards a true international reserve 
currency. Furthermore, the allocation of 22 billion 
sdrs approved by imf  member countries in 1997 
and since ratified by 133 of them (but still awaiting 
ratification by other countries to reach the requisite 
threshold of  85% of  Fund quotas) should be 
completed without delay.
The existing compensatory financing mechanisms 
of  the imf  should be significantly simplified, as 
current schemes are too numerous and complex. All 
compensatory facilities should have the attributes referred 
to of speedy disbursement, scale fully proportionate to 
the external shock and low conditionality to maximize 
the beneficial impact on recipient countries.11
11 In late 2008 the imf  approved a new mechanism similar to the 
one proposed in detail by Action against Hunger and Poverty at 
least since January 2007. This is the Short-Term Liquidity Facility 
(slf). The arrival of  the new Managing Director, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, has brought a welcome shift towards pragmatism 
and away from the extreme neoliberalism of earlier years.
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